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Abstract
This paper studies communication mechanisms for two players with symmetric
single-peaked preferences. The peaks are privately known and drawn from a uniform
distribution before the agents take a collective decision. While for the general set-
ting Moulin (1980) characterized all strategy-proof mechanisms, much remains to be
known in the Bayesian framework. The example consists of a dichotomic mechanism,
that yields a strictly higher ex-ante expected utility than the best ”min-max” rule.
The properties of the mechanism are analyzed, then limits and possible directions for
generalization are discussed.
Keywords: Single-peaked Preferences, Communication, Incentive Compatibility, Di-
chotomy
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1 Introduction
In a seminal paper, Moulin (1980) characterized all strategy-proof mechanisms for one-
dimensional single-peaked preferences, and those satisfying in addition Pareto-optimality.
∗This paper is a revised chapter of my PhD dissertation at Ecole Polytechnique. It was first presented
in 2003 at University Paris I (Eurequa). I would like to thank Willie Fuchs and Jon Levin for several
discussions, as well as Claude d’Aspremont, Rida Laraki, an anonymous referee, the associate editor and
especially Herve´ Moulin for helpful comments.
†Laboratoire d’Econome´trie de l’Ecole Polytechnique, 1, Rue Descartes, 75005 Paris and INRA-LORIA.
Email address:pierre.fleckinger@shs.polytechnique.fr.
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Border and Jordan (1983) extended the characterization to multidimensional single-peaked
preferences. More recently, it has also been extended to probabilistic mechanisms by Ehlers
et al. (2002). This paper considers Bayesian mechanisms for those settings, focusing on the
simplest case: two agents with peak-symmetric utility and uniform priors. While strategy
proof implementation has nice normative properties and yields robust results, communica-
tion (involving beliefs) is also appealing from a positive point of view, especially in settings
with few agents.
It is well known that Bayesian mechanisms generally perform better than strategy-proof
ones at least since d’Aspremont and Ge´rard-Varet (1979), in particular for settings with-
out transfers, because such mechanisms can use ”more” information. However, this concept
has not been applied to single-peaked preferences for two or more agents1, and nothing is
known about optimal Bayesian solutions. The contribution of this paper is not a charac-
terization result, rather the simple and intuitive mechanism presented could be seen as a
ﬁrst step towards more general results, or at least a ﬁrst glance in that direction. Indeed,
the construction is itself of interest in a context where optimal mechanisms are probably
very complicated. An algorithmic description is as follows. The mechanism proceeds by
sequentially bisecting the type space and asks the players to which subdivision their type
belongs, iterates while the messages match, and stops otherwise, selecting the splitting point
as outcome. Whether this mechanism is close to the optimal one remains an open question,
that is discussed after the exposition.
The next section sets up the problem and presents the dichotomic mechanism, the third
section compares the outcomes with that of the best ex-post implementable solution. Finally,
the last section broadens the discussion to the relevant literature while pointing out the
crucial points for extensions. Most of the technicalities and proofs are relegated to the
appendix.
1For similar models in the principal-agent framework, with only one informed party, see in particular
Melumad and Shibano (1991) for a first contribution. Martimort and Semenov (2006a) use that Bayesian
setting to study lobbying, but they use dominant-strategy implementation for the case of two agents.
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Figure 1: Setting
2 The example
2.1 setting
As already mentioned, the focus is on the simplest possible setting. Two agents must take
a common decision d ∈ D ≡ [0, 1], and they have single-peaked preferences with peaks
(a, b) ∈ T 2 ≡ [0, 1]2 representing their ideal decisions. They have the same utility function
u(x, d) = −(x − d)2 where x denotes the peak2. The restriction to quadratic preferences is
purely for expositional clarity, and it also allows for exact calculations. The ideas presented
below work for any single-peaked preferences that are symmetric and concave.
The types are privately known, and drawn i.i.d. from the uniform distribution on T . In
addition, we assume comparable utilities, so that we can deﬁne a measure of ex-post surplus3
as: S(a, b, d) = u(a, d) + u(b, d). Ex-ante and interim welfare are then deﬁned by taking the
relevant expectations.
As a reference, consider the ﬁrst-best case, without asymmetric information. Given the
concavity4 and the symmetry of preferences, it is straightforward to see that the surplus-
maximizing rule is:
dFB(a, b) =
a+ b
2
(1)
2The model could be also stated as a game, with types a, b, strategies da, db, and payoffs U(x, d) if
da = db = d, and a very bad payoff, say −M , with M large enough, if da 6= db. Then coordination is
absolutely necessary, and agents ”must” take the same decision. I am grateful to Jon Levin for suggesting
this interpretation.
3This is not essential, but makes comparisons between solution concepts straightforward, and implies
equal treatment of the players.
4In the case of linear preferences, any decision between a and b is ex-post optimal with the retained
criterion.
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Given its uniqueness, this rule is also optimal from an ex-ante point of view.
2.2 The dichotomic mechanism
We ﬁrst state two useful deﬁnitions.
Binary Development. For any real number x between 0 and 1, write its binary devel-
opment as:
x =
∞∑
k=1
xk
2k
where xk is 0 or 1, so that (xk) ∈ {0, 1}
N∗.
First different digit. For two numbers a and b, deﬁne s(a, b) as the smallest inte-
ger such that the corresponding binary digits of a and b diﬀer. Formally, s(a, b) = inf
k
{k |
ak + bk = 1}, and is possibly inﬁnite
5.
We are now in position to state the deﬁnition of the dichotomic mechanism.
Definition of the direct mechanism. Let (∆, T 2) be the following (deterministic)
direct revelation mechanism, which we refer to indiﬀerently as the ”dichotomic” or ”binary”
mechanism.
When agents announce (a, b), let us denote by (δk) the binary development of ∆(a, b). The
outcome is:
• δk = ak = bk for all k < s(a, b)
• δs(a,b) = 1
• δk = 0 for all k > s(a, b)
This completely deﬁnes the mechanism. Note that it would be equivalent to set δs(a,b) = 0
and δk = 1 for all k > s(a, b). The outcome of the mechanism is represented in ﬁgure 2,
together with the best ex-post implementable solution, anticipating a bit on the next section.
An alternative sequential definition. The mechanism is here deﬁned in an algorith-
mic way, ignoring ﬁrst the incentive constraints. The algorithm is initialized at k = 1.
Then at any stage k for which the mechanism has not stopped yet:
5Indeed, s(x, x) = +∞, because all digits coincide. Even in such a case, all series in the sequel clearly
converge.
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Figure 2: Mechanisms outcomes
• players announce simultaneously their kth digits ak and bk;
• if ak = bk, then set δk = ak and go to stage k + 1;
• if ak 6= bk, then set δk = 1 and δl = 0 for all l > k. The algorithm stops.
This algorithm is also an extensive form representation of the communication game. In
this representation, at each stage, the agents simultaneously announce a digit which means
”I am in the left (0) or right (1) part of the remaining interval”. If they belong to the same
half, they agree on the binary digit, and continue to reveal some information in the next
step, until they reach diﬀering digits, meaning they are in diﬀerent halves of the subinterval.
Put diﬀerently, they exchange more and more precise information while they agree, and
communication stops when they realize they have antagonist preferences, conditional on
what they then know. Indeed, when the mechanism stops, this means that each player
knows on which side of the own type the other one is, thus the situation then resembles a
bargaining. It is easily checked that the mechanism ends in ﬁnite time when the players
have diﬀerent types.
2.3 Properties of the mechanism
The fundamental property of the direct dichotomic mechanism is of course incentive-compatibility.
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Proposition 1 The mechanism (∆, T 2) has a truthful equilibrium. More precisely, truth-
telling is a strict best-response to truth-telling.
The detailed proof of this result is in the appendix. It relies mainly on the fact that a player
can not inﬂuence the probability of stopping at a given stage, provided the other player is
truthful.
Corollary 1 Truth-telling by both players is a Perfect Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the
extensive form dichotomic mechanism.
The proof of this result is virtually identical to that for the direct mechanism. The diﬀerence
is that the strategies now depend on the history of messages. However, given that one player
is truthful, the history of messages does not convey more information than that already con-
tained in the fact of having reached the current stage. Therefore, arguments similar to those
given in the proof of proposition 1 still apply concerning best replies against a truth-telling
opponent.
On the speed of convergence. A desirable feature of the sequential mechanism is that
it converges quickly. In addition, from a computational or information requirement point
of view, this aspect matters for the direct mechanism as well. Therefore, we compute the
expected stopping time τ , as follows. There is an unconditional probability 1
2k
that the ﬁrst
k digits coincide, which yields:
τ =
∞∑
k=1
k
2k
=
∞∑
k=1
1
2k
+
∞∑
k=1
k−1
2k
=
∞∑
k=1
1
2k
+ 1
2
∞∑
k=1
k
2k
= 1 + τ
2
, so that τ = 2.
We can also remark that the maximal time is ”small” with a high probability. Indeed,
given a 6= b, the maximal number of consecutive matching digits starting at 1 is K(a, b) =[
− ln(|a−b|)
ln(2)
]
+ 1, where [.] denotes the integer part. For example, if |a − b| ≥ 0.01, which
happens more than 98 percent of the time, the maximal number of steps is only 7.
3 Comparison with ex-post implementation
3.1 Ex-post Implementation and Phantom voters
We know that there exist non-trivial ex-post implementable - or strategy-proof - rules. The
full set of strategy-proof mechanisms has been characterized by Moulin (1980) for generic
single-peaked preferences. They are the so-called ”min-max” rules, that involve ﬁxed ballots
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(the ”phantom voters”) in addition to players messages. The number of phantom voters
depends on the required properties. In the present case, the preferences are completely
characterized by their peak, thus peaks-onliness is necessarily satisﬁed (see Barbera` (2001,
section 3), Ehlers et al. (2002, section 6) and the references therein for the deﬁnitions of the
properties one may want to impose on the deterministic mechanisms).
The mechanism for n voters thus works as follows: ﬁrst, choose and cast n+ 1 ballots, then
add the (real) votes, and take the median of all ballots as the result. If Pareto-optimality
is required, then one only needs n− 1 phantom voters. In the present Bayesian framework,
we want in addition to maximize ex-ante surplus. Since Pareto-optimality is weaker than
ex-post surplus maximization, itself weaker than ex-ante surplus maximization, we can here
restrict to one ﬁxed ballot. One easily obtains that with uniformly distributed types 1
2
must
be chosen to maximize ex-ante surplus. So, restricting to strategy-proofness, the unique
optimal rule simply boils down to:
dSP (a, b) = median(a, b,
1
2
) (2)
Note that this mechanism is continuous, while the dichotomic one is not.
It is now possible to understand how the dichotomic mechanism improves on the min-
max rule. With dominant strategy implementation, only one ﬁxed phantom voter is used
in the optimal mechanism. In turn, an inﬁnite (but countable) set of ﬁxed ballot is used in
the binary mechanism. Intuitively, the main feature that the dichotomic mechanism adds
is the possibility of selecting the phantom voters, by using some information on the realized
preferences.
3.2 Interim comparisons
We can compare the exact solutions in terms of interim expected utility with the quadratic
form. In the ﬁrst-best case, one has:
EuFB(a) =
∫ 1
0
−(a−
a + b
2
)2db = −
1
4
(a2 − a +
1
3
) (3)
For the phantom voters rule, we have when a ≤ 1
2
(and expected utility is symmetric around
1
2
):
EuPH(a) = a.0 +
∫ 1
2
a
−(a− b)2db+
1
2
(−(a−
1
2
)2)
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= −
1
2
(
1
2
− a)2 −
1
3
(
1
2
− a)3 (4)
To compute expected utility in the binary mechanism, one can notice that in the truthful
equilibrium, there is a probability one half of stopping at each step k, conditionally on
reaching this step k. This is stated as lemma 1 in the appendix. With a slight shortcut
in the notations, denote dk the outcome if the mechanism stops at step k for a type a
player. By construction, dk does not depend on b (as already mentioned, the sentence ”the
mechanism stops at step k” already conveys all the necessary information on b). Thus the
binary mechanism yields interim expected utility:
Eu∆(a) =
1
2
u(a, d1) +
1
2
[
1
2
u(a, d2) +
1
2
(
1
2
u(a, d3) +
1
2
(...)))
]
=
∞∑
k=1
1
2k
u(a, dk)
= −
∞∑
k=1
[
1
2k
(
∞∑
i=k
ai
2i
−
1
2k
)2
]
(5)
Despite the (very) discontinuous nature of the binary mechanism, the interim expected
utility is continuous. To see this, for any ε > 0 deﬁne K(ε) as the smallest integer such that
1
2K(ε)
< ε. Then for all z such that |z| < 1
2K(ε)
, |Eu∆(a)−Eu∆(a+ z)| < ε. The proof of this
claim is tedious although straightforward and is therefore omitted; it relies on the symmetry
of the mechanism: one has to separate between two symmetric cases for each k, depending
on whether the current digit match for a and a+ z.
Surprisingly, the interim expected utility in the binary mechanism is not maximized for 1
2
.
It is seen for example in considering the types 1
2
and 3
8
. When k > 3, the terms in (5) are
the same. In turn they diﬀer for the ﬁrst three stages, and we have:
Eu∆(
1
2
)−Eu∆(
3
8
) =
[
−0−
1
4
(
1
4
)2 −
1
8
(
1
8
)2
]
+
[
1
2
(
1
8
)2 +
1
4
(
1
8
)2 + 0
]
= −
3
512
Figure 3 illustrates those diﬀerent solutions. In particular, PV favors most the type
around 1
2
than ∆, while both rules give more utility to that types than the ﬁrst-best. An
intuitive reason for this fact is that those types have large possible deviations, while types
close to the sides can not overstate their type too much (see section 4.1 for more detailed
statements).
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Figure 3: Interim expected utility
3.3 Ex-ante comparison
The calculations of ex-ante utility for the ﬁrst-best and the phantom voters cases are straight-
forward. One obtains by integrating (3) and (4):
EuFB = −
1
24
and EuPH = −
5
96
For the binary mechanism, computations are a bit more involved. Integrating (5) yields:
Eu∆ = −
∫ 1
0
(
∞∑
k=1
[
1
2k
(
∞∑
i=k
ai
2i
−
1
2k
)2
])
da
= −
∞∑
k=1
[
1
2k
∫ 1
0
(
∞∑
i=k
ai
2i
−
1
2k
)2da
]
(6)
Note that for any (xj)1≤j≤k−1 in {0, 1}
k−1, we have the property:
∫ k−1∑
j=1
xj
2j
+ 1
2k
k−1∑
j=1
xj
2j
(
∞∑
i=k
ai
2i
−
1
2k
)2da does not depend on (xj)
Thus we obtain the following:
∫ 1
0
(
∞∑
i=k
ai
2i
−
1
2k
)2da = 2k
∫ 1
2k
0
(
∞∑
i=k
ai
2i
−
1
2k
)2da
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But for the second integral, ai = 0 for all i < k on the integration interval, so that
∞∑
i=k
ai
2i
= a.
Substituting in (6), one obtains:
Eu∆ = −
∞∑
k=1
∫ 1
2k
0
(a−
1
2k
)2da = −
∞∑
k=1
1
3
1
8k
= −
1
21
The next table sums up those quantitative results:
EuFB Eu∆ EuPH
− 84
2016
− 96
2016
− 105
2016
4 Discussion and relation to the literature
4.1 On optimal Bayesian mechanisms
This subsection discusses the issue of optimal mechanisms for the simple problem considered.
While for the case of one single agent Melumad and Shibano (1991) obtain a quite general
characterization6, things dramatically change for two agents. In particular, since the incen-
tive constraint for one agent is taken in expectation with respect to the other’s type, their
diﬀerential approach becomes inapplicable in the present case. Even the simplest properties,
such as monotonicity, can not be obtained as in their framework. Since in addition optimal
mechanisms are not a priori continuously diﬀerentiable7, and in fact not even continuous,
standard tools are useless.
The ﬁrst-best rule is of course not incentive-compatible, but it is still instructive to look
at the deviations involved. Consider without loss of generality the corresponding direct
revelation mechanism, and deﬁne the expected utility of a type a player, sending to the
6They show in particular that mechanisms will in general be discontinuous, even with the uniform dis-
tribution. Martimort and Semenov (2006b) give conditions under which the optimal mechanism will be
continuous.
7Guesnerie and Laffont (1984), for the principal-agent model under adverse selection, derive conditions
under which the optimal mechanism must be continuously differentiable. In such a case, one can restrict
optimization to a set that we know is compact from Ascoli’s Theorem, guaranteeing the existence of optimal
mechanisms. In the case of single-peaked preferences, requiring differentiability may be very restrictive,
as Border and Jordan (1983, p.155) point out ”differentiability alone goes a long way toward eliminating
nondictatorial straightforward mechanisms” (Straightforward is another word for strategy-proof, or ex-post
implementable).
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mechanism a message m from the set T , given that the other agent announces truthfully:
v(a,m) =
∫ 1
0
−(a−
m+ b
2
)2db (7)
Assume m(.), the mapping from types to preferred messages is almost everywhere continu-
ously diﬀerentiable. Optimization requires that ∂v
∂m
(a,m∗(a)) = 0 at a point of diﬀerentia-
bility, under the constraint that 0 ≤ m ≤ 1, which yields:
m∗(a) = min(max(2a −
1
2
, 0), 1)
This does not match the incentive compatibility requirement, i.e. m∗(a) = a, except for
types 0, 1
2
and 1. Agents to the left of one half have incentives to understate their type,
while agents to the right would overstate it. In other words there are countervailing incen-
tives. This is the essence of the diﬃculty in ﬁnding the optimal mechanism (provided it
exists...). In an auctions setting, Grigorieva et al. (2005)8 construct a bisection mechanism
whose central idea is nearly the same as that of the dichotomic mechanism, and they are
able to show that under rather wide circumstances it is eﬃcient and at the same time econ-
omizes on information revelation rounds9. Obtaining those results is possible with auctions
because players never have incentives to overstate their valuations. The only deviations to
prevent are understatement of the types. With single-peaked preferences, we just saw that
deviations can go either way.
Another important diﬀerence is that the issue in their model, as in general with auctions,
is on the interplay between participation and information revelation. Speciﬁcally, bisecting
the type space allows to use mild information revelation to solve the participation problem.
Once that issue is resolved, revelation is fairly easy since the procedure allocates the object
at a price equal to the second-highest bid, whose revelation is costless in terms of incentives
once allocation has been determined. This kind of procedure heavily relies on monotonicity
with respect to type, in order to dissociate participation and revelation. On the contrary,
in the present setting, revelation is the core issue while the participation issue is assumed
away - which reduces the screening possibilities. Finally, the kind of mechanism presented
here can not be deﬁned independently of the priors, as is possible in the case of auctions,
and the eﬃciency issue is thereby much more pervasive.
8I am grateful to the Associate Editor for having brought this reference to my knowledge.
9On this point, there is also a growing literature straddling mechanism design and computer sciences, see
Fadel and Segal (2006) for a representative recent contribution. Complexity of the mechanism is the core
concept in that perspective.
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4.2 Extensions
Despite the diﬃculties just mentioned, the main idea behind the mechanism, namely bisect-
ing the type space10 in a recursive way, could probably be extended to non-uniform prior
and/or non-symmetric single-peak preferences. There are a number of additional diﬃcul-
ties on the way. The main one for the present setting is that one would need to deﬁne at
each stage a splitting point and a stopping point that may diﬀer (while they are both the
midpoint with uniform priors and symmetric peaks). Therefore it is problematic to keep
sequential incentive-compatibility and Pareto-optimality at the same time. To grasp some
intuition on this, assume that for a given message history, s is the splitting point and δ the
stopping point, and that they are diﬀerent, say s < δ. If the players have been truthful up
to the current stage, then for some types a, b, we have a < s < b < δ. Then the stopping
point is not Pareto-optimal. This is so even at the ﬁrst stage as soon as the splitting and
the stopping point diﬀer. Overall, ﬁnding the general family of splitting and stopping points
appears an extremely hard recursive11 problem.
A related diﬃculty concerns the rather simple recursive formulae we are able to use to
express expected utility. In the uniform prior case, conditional (on the type, and on the
current stage) and unconditional probability of stopping in k stages from the current one
never depend on types nor on current stage, which considerably simpliﬁes the analysis. This
property is lost without uniform priors, which adds a second diﬃculty for a generalization
to non-symmetric cases.
Finally, the extension of such mechanisms to more than two agents can still be envisioned.
Clearly, with bisection, there are already improvements with respect to a direct min-max
mechanism. A generalization could be as follows: if all agents are in the same subinterval,
iterates in that interval, otherwise, run a standard min-max mechanism calibrated on the
current interval. Then, again, the recursive structure of the mechanism can be applied.
However, ﬁnding the divisions in that case would be subject to the same complex recursive
problem as above, in an even more constrained version.
10It is possible to show that divisions in more than two sub-intervals can not satisfy incentive compatibility.
11Considering the direct mechanism embeds the equivalent problem in the incentive constraint, but con-
sidering recursivity - therefore the sequential version - is again more illustrative.
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4.3 A cheap talk perspective
Although a mechanism design approach is used here, there is a connection with long cheap-
talk (Aumann and Hart, 2003; Amita¨ı, 1996). A bit more structure is needed to sketch, very
informally, the parallel. Assume that, after some communication has taken place through
long cheap talk, the decision is determined by a bargaining game, whose outcome depends
only on the information that has been revealed. Thus we extend a bargaining-like situation
by adding a communication phase, in the spirit of Farrell and Gibbons (1989). Assume in
addition equal bargaining powers. Then in the communication phase, information can be
exchanged as in the binary mechanism. Once the players discover they are in diﬀerent (sub-
)intervals, the bargaining process conditioned only on public information deﬁnes the same
point as the dichotomic mechanism. Overall, the cheap talk allows ﬁrst to identify the com-
mon interest part of the preferences, then it is common knowledge that the players are in a
situation of conﬂict, whose outcome is deﬁned through a Nash-like bargaining. In that case,
both players would indeed prefer to exchange some information through bisection cheap talk.
A last point deserving attention is the link between the revelation dynamics described
here and the jointly controlled lotteries used in Aumann and Hart’s characterization. The
canonical representation of the cheap-talk phase they introduce is a process alternating joint
lotteries periods and revelation periods. A joint controlled lottery in that characterization
is a way of generating randomness in the communication stage. On the contrary here, the
messages convey information at each stage, but thanks to the uniform distribution, both
messages of one player are equally likely in the eyes of the other player. In the end, contin-
uation is thus determined jointly, and no player can alone inﬂuence, as in a joint controlled
lottery. But, once again, these messages are also informative.
Crawford and Sobel (1982) pioneered the interest in cheap talk by showing that even
absent mechanism (a commitment device) and monetary incentives, some information could
still be revealed between parties with conﬂicting preferences. In their model, the amount
of information revealed in equilibrium increases as the conﬂict of interest decreases. While
the bias, as measured by the constant diﬀerence between the peaks, is perfectly known in
their model, here it is not. The two players may have the same peaks, as well as com-
pletely antagonistic preferences, but they do not know by how much their preferences diﬀer.
Nonetheless, the amount of information revealed in the dichotomic mechanism (or in the
suggested adaptation to long cheap talk) is also increasing as the realized conﬂict of interest
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decreases. Indeed, information revelation in equilibrium is more precise the closer (a, b) is
to the diagonal. Therefore, the intuition that closer preferences leads to more information
revelation is preserved when the (endogenous) intensity of conﬂict is not known ex-ante.
A Incentive Compatibility of the dichotomic mecha-
nism
A pure strategy in the mechanism (∆, T 2) is a mapping σ : T → T , that we can equivalently
deﬁne as a mapping from {0, 1}N
∗
to itself, using binary developments. We allow for mixed
strategies, but seldom need them.
The truth-telling strategy, denoted TT , is the identity function on T .
A type x ∈ T is said to be finite if: ∃n ∈ N∗ such that xk = xn for all k > n. Thus a
ﬁnite type is such that the digits of its binary development are identical after some stage. A
n-finite type is a ﬁnite type such that xn−1 = 1− xn and xk = xn for all k > n, that is, n is
the ﬁrst digit where the sequence consisting of only 0’s or 1’s begins.
A ﬁnite type has two possible binary developments, since
(x1, .., xn−1, xn, .., xn, ...) ≡ (x1, .., 1− xn−1, 1− xn, .., 1− xn, ...)
In that case, we consider that both messages are truthful, as well as mixing between them,
to dissipate the (minor) ambiguity in deﬁning the strategy (anyway, these types have zero
measure in T ).
Since the goal is to prove that truth-telling by both players is an equilibrium, we assume
in all what follows that one player tells the truth (uses strategy TT ) and consider the point of
view of the other player, whose type is some a. We use reduced notations whenever this is not
confusing. The aim is to prove that TT (on the part of type a) is a strict best-response to TT .
We ﬁrst need a proper expression of the payoﬀs.
Lemma 1 When the other player uses strategy TT , the unconditional probability of stopping
at a given stage k does not depend on the strategy. The payoff conditional on stopping at a
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given stage k depends only on a, k and the strategy. The expected utility of a pure strategy
σ against TT is:
E[u∆(σ, TT )|a] = −
∞∑
k=1
[
1
2k
(a−
k−1∑
i=1
σi(a)
2i
−
1
2k
)2
]
Proof. Fix a, denote S a mixed strategy and (si) the binary development of the realization
of S. Let b denote the type of the other player. Given that the other player uses TT , the
probability that the ith digits match is independent on si, it is
1
2
, if si = 0 or if si = 1, thus
also 1
2
overall. The probability of stopping at stage k is the probability that all the ﬁrst k−1
digits match but not the kth one. Given the uniform prior, the digits bi are independent,
thus the unconditional probability of stopping is simply 1
2k
.
When the mechanism stops at a given stage k, by deﬁnition the ﬁrst k − 1 digits match,
and δi(σ(a), b) = σi(a) for i < k, and the remaining digits do not depend on the types. The
outcome conditional on stopping at stage k when σ is used is thus:
dk(σ, TT |a) =
k−1∑
i=1
σ(a)i
2i
+
1
2k
The expected utility can then be written in expectation over the stopping stage k, which
ends the proof.
The next lemma inquires what kind of non-truthful strategies we have to consider.
Lemma 2 If the other player is truthful, then the best pure strategies of a player with type
a if he lies at least for one digit have the form: (a1, ..., at−1, 1 − at, at, .., at, ...) ≡ Lt(a) for
some t.
Proof. Fix a, denote σ a pure strategy and (σi) the binary development of σ(a). A mixed
strategy is deﬁned the usual way, but as will be clear, they are needed only in very special
case. Without loss of generality, assume that up to some t, possibly equal to 1, the strategy
is truthful, i.e. σi = ai for all i < t, but that the t
th digit is wrong (the ”ﬁrst” lie). Any pure
non-truthful strategy always takes this form.
We can now express the outcome of the mechanism conditional on stopping at stage k:
dk(σ(a)) =
t−1∑
i=1
ai
2i
+
1− at
2t
+
k−1∑
i=t+1
σi
2i
+
1
2k
(8)
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with the usual convention that the second sum is null when k − 1 < t + 1. Because b uses
TT , the expected payoﬀ of σ, denoted Uσ(a), is given from the ﬁrst lemma by:
Uσ(a) = EU
∆(σ, TT |a) = Ek
[
u
(
a, dk(σ(a))
)]
= −
∞∑
k=1
1
2k
[
a− dk(σ(a))
]2
Given (8), Uσ(a) can be rewritten as:
Uσ(a) = −
∞∑
k=1

 1
2k
(
∞∑
i=t
ai
2i
−
1− at
2t
−
k−1∑
i=t+1
σi
2i
−
1
2k
)2 (9)
Depending on the relative position of the type to the division of the subinterval, two cases
are possible: a ≥ dt(σ(a)), and a ≤ dt(σ(a)). Since they are symmetric, we consider only
the ﬁrst case, in which at = 1. Equation (9) writes:
Uσ(a1, .., at−1, 1, at+1, ...) = −
∞∑
k=1

 1
2k
(
∞∑
i=t+1
ai
2i
+
1
2t
−
k−1∑
i=t+1
σi
2i
−
1
2k
)2 (10)
Now, remark that
k−1∑
i=t+1
σi
2i
+
1
2k
≤
k−1∑
i=t+1
1
2i
+
1
2k
=
1
2t
−
1
2k−1
+
1
2k
=
1
2t
−
1
2k
From which we deduce that in (10), each of the terms in the parentheses is positive for k > t.
Optimizing with respect to (σi)i≥t+1 thus requires to minimize each of these terms, which
is done by setting σi = 1 for all i ≥ t + 1. The case at = 0 being symmetric, we have the
desired conclusion.
It is clear that the players could use more sophisticated lying strategy by mixing on the
set of Lt strategies. However, we show now that any pure strategy Lt is strictly dominated
by TT , and thus no mixing can involve one.
We have to compare what a player can get in the mechanism by telling the truth or by
using a strategy  Lt. Fix a, t and assume at = 1 (once again, the case at = 0 is symmetric).
For k ≤ t, u
(
a, dk(Lt(a))
)
= u
(
a, dk(TT (a))
)
by deﬁnition of Lt, and for k > t, we have:
u
(
a, dk(Lt(a))
)
= −
(
∞∑
i=t
ai
2i
+
1
2k
)2
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while:
u
(
a, dk(TT (a))
)
= −
(
∞∑
i=k
ai
2i
−
1
2k
)2
If there exists some z > t such that az = 1, then u
(
a, dk(TT (a))
)
> u
(
a, dk(Lt(a))
)
, from
which we can conclude that TT strictly dominates Lt.
If ak = 0 for all k > t, then a is a t-ﬁnite type (recall that at = 1) and then, by conven-
tion, Lt is also considered truthful, because Lt(a) ≡ TT (a). Truth-telling is thus the only
(strictly) preferred strategy.
Overall we have proved that truth-telling is a strict best-response to truth-telling, mean-
ing that the mechanism is incentive-compatible.
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